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Abstract	
In	 charting	 out	 the	 ‘four	 ways’	 of	 eco‐global	 criminology,	 this	 paper	 discusses	 the	
importance	of	recognising	and	acting	in	regards	to	the	differences	evident	in	(1)	ways	of	
being	(ontology),	(2)	ways	of	knowing	(epistemology),	(3)	ways	of	doing	(methodology)	and	
(4)	 ways	 of	 valuing	 (axiology).	 The	 paper	 assumes	 and	 asserts	 that	 global	 study	 of	
environmental	crime	is	essential	to	the	green	criminology	project,	and	particularly	an	eco‐
global	criminology	approach.	Specific	instances	of	criminal	and	harmful	activity	therefore	
need	 to	be	analysed	 in	 the	 context	of	 broad	 international	 social,	 political,	 economic	 and	
ecological	 processes.	 The	 article	 outlines	 the	 key	 ideas	 of	 eco‐global	 criminology,	 a	
perspective	 that	 argues	 that	 global	 study	 must	 always	 be	 inclusive	 of	 voices	 from	 the	
periphery	 and	 margins	 of	 the	 world’s	 metropolitan	 centres,	 and	 critical	 of	 the	 social	
relations	 that	 sustain	 the	 epistemological	 as	 well	 as	 material	 realities	 and	 legacies	 of	
colonialism	and	imperialism.	Yet,	in	doing	so,	there	arise	many	paradoxes	and	conundrums	
that	likewise	warrant	close	attention.		
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Introduction	
One	of	 the	 outstanding	 contributions	 of	 ‘southern	 theory’	 (Carrington,	Hogg	 and	 Sozzo	2016;	
Connell	 2007)	 is	 that	 it	 propels	 us	 to	 consider	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 periphery	 in	 assessing	
knowledge	and	experiences	that	too	often	are	interpreted	solely	from	a	universalising	‘northern’	
perspective.	 Acknowledgement	 is	 needed,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 geographical	 and	 metaphorical	
‘south’	likewise	has	its	contributions	to	a	needed	global	dialogue	about	‘what	is’	and	‘what	ought	
to	be’,	about	what	and	who	counts	or	should	count,	and	about	the	state	of	the	planet	generally.		
	
These	 considerations	 are	 likewise	of	 central	 concern	 to	 eco‐global	 criminology	 (White	2011).	
Eco‐global	criminology	refers	to	an	analytical	framework	that	focuses	on	the	interrelated	matters	
of	 the	ecological	 (the	 ‘eco’),	 the	 transnational	 (the	 ‘global’),	 and	 justice	 (the	 ‘criminology’).	 Its	
substantive	focus	is	transgressions	against	ecosystems,	humans	and	animals.	Underpinning	eco‐
global	criminology	is	acknowledgement	that	contemporary	social	arrangements	are	constituted	
as	relations	of	power	and	sectoral	interests.	Equally	important	to	this	perspective	is	the	notion	
that	‘what	we	know’	and	‘how	we	know’	are	intrinsically	socially	patterned	and	constituted.	That	
is,	 interpretations	 and	 responses	 to	 environmental	 harm	 require	 careful	 contextualisation	 as	
different	social	 interests	are	 frequently	at	play,	with	diverse	understandings	of	any	particular	
issue	 in	 any	 given	 situation.	 From	 an	 eco‐global	 criminology	 perspective,	 it	 is	 context	 that	 is	
crucial.		
	
To	speak	of	crimes	against	the	environment	or	eco‐crime	(ecological	crime)	is	to	acknowledge	
some	kind	of	specificity	in	the	act	or	omission	that	makes	it	distinctly	relevant	to	environmental	
and	 criminological	 considerations.	 What	 marks	 out	 eco‐global	 criminology	 from	 other	 green	
criminological	perspectives	(see	South	and	Brisman	2013;	White	and	Heckenberg	2014)	is	the	
attention	given	to	specifically	ecological	considerations	of	harm	(the	lawful	but	awful)	rather	than	
criminal	definitions	(the	unlawful)	as	such,	as	well	as	its	global	perspective	on	issues	and	events.	
The	major	threats	to	planetary	wellbeing	presented	by	climate	change,	diminished	bio‐diversity	
and	pollution	are	considered	core	issues.	Arising	from	the	eco‐global	perspective	is	an	enhanced	
appreciation	 of	 the	 need	 for	 collaboration	 involving	 individuals,	 groups	 and	 countries	 from	
different	 geographical	 regions.	 Such	 collaborative	 efforts	 are	 vital	 in	 regards	 to	 research,	
investigation	and	exposure	of	environmental	harm	and	victimisation.	They	are	also	essential	in	
responding	to	issues	and	trends,	and	especially	for	engaging	in	action	supportive	of	progressive	
social	and	ecological	change.		
	
Yet,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 issues	 relating	 to	 environmental	 harm	demands	more	 than	 simply	
application	of	a	multi‐method	approach	 to	 their	 study	and	appreciation	 that	 these	harms	and	
crimes	are	interconnected	and	intertwined	in	various	ways	on	a	worldwide	scale.	Thinking	and	
doing	are	complex	and	multifaceted,	reflecting	vastly	different	situations	and	circumstances	and	
yet	 simultaneously	 embodying	 shared	 aspects	 of	 the	 human	 condition	 (and,	 indeed,	 the	
nonhuman	condition).	Fundamentally,	for	an	informed	and	empowering	approach	to	eco‐justice,	
a	vital	task	is	to	expose	and	unpack	‘how	we	know	what	we	know’	and	to	critically	reflect	on	the	
ambiguities,	paradoxes,	opportunities	and	blind	alleys	that	such	an	exercise	inevitably	entails.		
	
In	charting	out	the	‘four	ways’	of	eco‐global	criminology,	this	article	discusses	the	importance	of	
recognising	and	acting	in	regards	to	the	differences	evident	in	(1)	ways	of	being	(ontology),	(2)	
ways	 of	 knowing	 (epistemology),	 (3)	 ways	 of	 doing	 (methodology)	 and	 (4)	 ways	 of	 valuing	
(axiology).	In	discussing	these	various	‘ologies’,	the	paper	grapples	with	the	difficulties	posed	by	
attempts	to	be	inclusive	of	voices	from	the	periphery,	including	the	dispossessed,	the	young	and	
the	 elderly,	 and	 especially	 those	 that	 are	 critical	 of	 the	 social	 relations	 that	 sustain	 the	
epistemological	as	well	as	the	material	realities	and	legacies	of	colonialism	and	imperialism.	The	
‘voices’	of	Nature	are	also	of	relevance	to	the	discussion.	These	difficulties	are	not	solely	logistical,	
cultural,	 linguistic	 and/or	 financial.	 As	 the	 paper	 discusses,	 issues	 of	 essentialism	 and	
reductionism	also	loom	large	in	any	project	that	purports	to	tackle	environmental	harm	in	the	
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ways	suggested	by	eco‐global	criminology.	The	article	uses	certain	exemplars	 to	 illustrate	 the	
problems	and	 limitations	of	 trying	 to	apply	notions	of	 ‘inclusion’	uncritically	and	without	due	
regard	for	context	and	contestation.		
	
Ways	of	being		
In	 discussing	 the	 complexities	 of	 ontology	 or	 ways	 of	 being,	 this	 section	 focuses	 mainly	 on	
Indigenous	experiences.	It	begins	with	the	idea	that	environmental	victimisation	can	be	uniquely	
experienced	by	Indigenous	communities.	That	is,	the	specific	material	and	cultural	positioning	of	
Indigenous	 people	 within	 certain	 landscapes	 is	 vital	 to	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 their	
environmental	victimisation.	For	example,	in	New	South	Wales	(NSW),	a	contractor	to	Ausgrid	
(an	energy	provider)	damaged	an	Aboriginal	rock	engraving	while	undertaking	excavation	works	
for	a	new	electrical	substation.	In	the	court	proceedings	(see	Chief	Executive,	Office	of	Environment	
and	Heritage	v	Ausgrid	[2013]	NSWLEC	51)	an	affidavit	was	tendered	by	an	Aboriginal	leader	that	
said	that:	
	
The	proper	protection	of	Aboriginal	culture	and	heritage	is	of	deep	importance	to	
the	NSW	Aboriginal	Land	Council	and	Aboriginal	communities	in	NSW.	In	this	case,	
the	harm	that	has	occurred	due	to	the	engraving	being	sliced	in	half	means	that	the	
engraving	can	never	be	replaced.	The	destruction	of	Aboriginal	sites,	such	as	has	
occurred	in	this	instance	impacts	on	the	ability	of	Aboriginal	peoples	to	connect	
with	a	living	culture	of	the	past.	These	sites	tell	important	stories	for	Aboriginal	
communities	 and	 must	 be	 protected	 to	 provide	 Aboriginal	 people	 with	
opportunities	to	strengthen	and	maintain	culture	now	and	in	the	future.	(Ausgrid	
at	[55])	
	
The	phrase	‘connect	with	a	living	culture	of	the	past’	is	particularly	important	here.	This	connotes	
a	dynamic	and	continuously	vibrant	relationship	between	local	Indigenous	communities	and	the	
land	upon	and	within	which	they	live.	Central	 to	 this	 is	 the	 idea	of	 ‘land’	or	 ‘country’	(Connell	
2007;	Graham	2008).	 In	New	Zealand,	 similar	 sorts	of	assertions	are	also	made	 in	 regards	 to	
Maori	relationships	with	Nature,	including	rivers	(Morris	and	Ruru	2010).	
	
Indeed,	 the	 special	 relationship	 between	 Indigenous	 communities	 and	 land/Nature	 finds	
expression	in	a	number	of	different	places	and	ways	worldwide,	a	point	made	by	Suzuki	(2010:	
71)	when	he	observes:	
	
Whether	it’s	 in	the	Amazon,	the	Serengeti,	or	the	Australian	outback,	Aboriginal	
people	speak	of	Earth	as	their	mother	and	tell	us	we	are	created	by	the	four	sacred	
elements:	Earth,	Air,	Fire,	and	Water.	I	realized	that	we	had	defined	the	problem	
incorrectly.	I	had	pressed	for	laws	and	institutions	to	regulate	our	interaction	with	
the	environment	when,	in	fact,	there	is	no	environment	‘out	there’,	separate	from	
us;	I	came	to	realise	that	we	are	the	environment.		
	
It	is	thus	not	a	question	of	humans	owning	the	land,	or	the	land	owning	humans:	it	is	far	deeper	
than	this.	These	expressions	of	connection	and	interrelationship	have	profound	implications	for	
understanding	 and	 responding	 to	 desecration	 of	 Indigenous	 lands	 and	 waters.	 So,	 too,	 do	
declarations	on	 the	 rights	of	Mother	Earth,	which	stem	 in	part	 from	the	efforts	of	 Indigenous	
peoples	worldwide	to	gain	international	recognition	and	acknowledgement	of	the	Earth‐People	
connection	 (United	 Nations	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Council	 2010).	 The	 Earth	 is	 experienced	 as	
sacred	and	vital,	a	source	of	spiritual	strength	and	wholeness,	and	part	of	a	harmonious	unity	
between	land	and	human.	Fundamentally,	acknowledgement	of	distinctive	spheres	of	thought,	
attitudes,	social	relations	and	styles	of	behaviour	in	regards	to	Indigenous	ontology	means	that	
taken‐for‐granted	 assumptions	 regarding	 Indigenous	 people’s	 lived	 experiences,	 from	 a	
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‘whiteness’	or	non‐Indigenous	perspective,	need	to	be	challenged,	especially	in	the	light	of	their	
connection	with	land/Nature	(Watson	2015).	
	
Yet	there	are	two	significant	question	marks	about	this	scenario	that	also	have	to	be	addressed.	
The	first	relates	to	the	fact	that	the	‘Indigenous	experience’	is	in	fact	highly	variable,	and	this	has	
implications	 for	 how	 one	 interprets	 Indigenous	 connections	 with	 Nature,	 including	 through	
‘traditional’	activities.	As	part	of	 this	consideration	 there	 is	a	need,	as	well,	 to	consider	global	
knowledge	transfers	involving	Indigenous	people	and	how	this	might	impact	upon	daily	practices.		
	
Consider,	for	example,	fishing	(see	White	2008).	What	is	actually	meant	by	the	word	‘traditional’	
in	 this	 instance?	 This	 can	 refer	 to	 quite	 different	 aspects	 of	 traditional	 fishing,	 such	 as:	who	
specifically	 (Indigenous	 Australian,	 Indigenous	 Indonesian,	 Papua	 New	 Guinea,	 Torres	 Strait	
Islander);	 how	 specifically	 (methods,	 techniques	 and	 technologies);	 and	 where	 specifically	
(traditional	 fisheries	 for	 particular	 coastal	 groups).	 From	 an	 eco‐global	 criminological	
perspective,	conflicts	can	arise	when	modern	technologies	are	utilised	for	what	used	to	be	simply	
subsistence	 fishing.	 The	 use	 of	motor	 boats,	 nets	 and	 fishing	 rods,	 and	 sonar	 equipment,	 for	
example,	allows	for	overexploitation	to	occur.	The	unrestrained	exploitation	of	resources	may	be	
due	to	employment	of	new	technologies,	perceptions	of	resources	being	boundless,	and	where	
management	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 beyond	 human	 control	 (Caughley,	 Bomford	 and	McNee	 1996).	
Moreover,	overexploitation	may	be	generated	in	the	new	methods	of	production	themselves.	For	
example,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 mobility,	 range	 and	 efficiency	 of	 ‘traditional’	 fishing	 are	 all	
enhanced	 through	modern	methods	 and	 technologies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 these	 technologies	
generate	the	need	for	cash	to	supplement	subsistence	(for	example,	buying	the	boat	and	petrol	
for	the	boat).	The	net	effect	 is	pressure	to	fish	beyond	immediate	consumption	needs.	That	 is,	
traditional	fishing	today	often	has	an	interface	with	the	cash	economy:	fish	to	eat,	and	fish	to	sell	
to	subsist	(Altman,	Bek	and	Roach	1996;	Caughley,	Bomford	and	McNee	1996).		
	
This	observation	serves	to	highlight	the	interplay	between	the	‘modern’	and	‘traditional’	in	ways	
that	make	non‐Indigenous	perception	of	Indigenous	ontology	that	much	harder	to	interpret	and	
understand.	 Moreover,	 the	 impact	 of	 colonialism	 on	 Indigenous	 experience	 also	 has	 to	 be	
recognised.	Many	 Indigenous	people,	 for	example,	do	not	have	an	 ‘intrinsic’	 connection	 to	 the	
land.	For	them,	there	 is	no	 ‘country’	as	such.	This	 is	especially	the	case	for	children	who	were	
taken	from	their	families	and	communities	at	an	early	age:	the	‘stolen	generations’	(see	Paradies	
2006).	It	is	also	applicable	to	Indigenous	people	raised	on	missions	and	as	Christians,	which	in	
turn	lead	to	profound	misunderstandings	and	conflicts	within	Indigenous	society,	as	evident	in	
disputed	claims	amongst	Indigenous	women	about	‘Hindmarsh	Island’	in	South	Australia	being	a	
place	for	‘secret	women’s	business’	(Gelder	and	Jacobs	1997;	Mead	1995).	On	top	of	this,	there	is	
the	 phenomenon	 of	 young	 Indigenous	 people	 being	 influenced	 by	 transnational	 media	 (via	
satellite	technologies	and	the	Internet)	in	ways	that	undermine	community,	encourage	disrespect	
of	 elders,	 and	 incorporate	 some	 of	 the	worst	 aspects	 of	Western	 culture:	 the	 youth	 gangs	 of	
Wadeye	in	remote	desert	of	the	Northern	Territory	being	a	case	in	point	(White	2013a).	Not	all	
Indigenous	experiences	are	 the	same,	and	presumably	 this	also	extends	 to	 their	 relationships	
with	Nature.		
	
The	second	query	stems	from	how	to	interpret	the	experiences	of	those	non‐Indigenous	people	
who	may	likewise	experience	Nature	in	a	particularly	profound	and	unique	fashion	(relative	to	
the	Western	norm).	With	respect	to	this,	non‐Indigenous	experiences	of	Nature	can	occasionally	
appear	to	mirror	those	of	the	Indigenous.	For	instance,	Hamilton	(2014)	raises	several	questions	
that	aim	to	broaden	the	scope	of	‘environmental	victim’	in	ways	that	allow	other	voices	and	other	
agendas	to	be	considered,	particularly	in	restorative	justice	types	of	forums.	Writing	in	relation	
to	the	clearing	of	native	vegetation	and	threatened	species,	he	asks:	
	
The	environment,	consisting	of	the	endangered	plant,	is	obviously	the	victim	but	
can	this	be	extended	to	conservation	groups	who	seek	to	protect	the	environment,	
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or	even	those	who	enjoy	looking	at	the	plant	species	in	the	natural	environment?	
If	 the	 circumstances	 were	 appropriate,	 with	 a	 willing	 and	 acceptable	 offender,	
would	a	restorative	justice	conference	with	such	conservation	groups	and	plant	
enthusiasts	 be	 one	 way	 of	 imparting	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 to	 the	
offender?		
	
Maybe	the	net	should	be	cast	wider	to	include	National	Parks	and	Wildlife	Rangers	
in	 the	 conference,	 as	 they	 are	 indirect	 victims	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 offence	
because	they	have	had	their	good	work	in	protecting	the	environment	undermined	
by	the	commission	of	the	offence.	(Hamilton	2014:	270)	
	
Nonetheless,	these	interests	notwithstanding,	there	seems	to	be	a	significant	difference	between	
Indigenous	and	non‐Indigenous	relationships	to	land/Nature.	The	distinctiveness	of	Indigenous	
ways	of	being	(and	ways	of	knowing)	is	reflected,	for	example,	in	laws	such	as	those	that	provide	
for	the	protection	of	Aboriginal	heritage	(for	instance,	the	National	Parks	and	Wildlife	Act	1974	
NSW)	and	in	court	processes	which	privilege	their	voice	in	relation	to	this	(Hamilton	2008;	White	
2015).		
	
But	both	non‐Indigenous	Earth	Law	proponents	and	radical	environmentalists	might	beg	to	differ	
that	somehow	their	visions	of	Nature,	and	their	experiences	of	Nature,	should	somehow	be	de‐
valued	 by	 comparison	 with	 Indigenous	 connections	 with	 ‘country’.	 Recent	 research	 on	 the	
revelatory	 experiences	 of	 forest	 activists	 and	 anti‐whaling	 activists	 –	 due	 precisely	 to	 the	
development	of	a	close	relationship	with	natural	objects	(such	as	trees)	and	creatures	of	the	sea	
(such	as	whales)	–	highlight	the	emphatic	and	profound	closeness	of	these	activists	with	Nature	
(Cianchi	2015).	They	identify	with	Nature,	and	in	so	doing	do	not	see	themselves	as	separate	from	
Nature.	The	parallels	with	the	Indigenous	experience	described	earlier	are	compelling.	
	
Even	 this	 superficial	 overview	 provides	 an	 indication	 that	matters	 of	 ontology	 deserve	 close	
critical	scrutiny.	Essentialism	that	is	too	inclusive	ignores	the	multiple	voices	within	a	community	
(that	is,	amongst	and	between	Indigenous	groups),	and	that	which	is	too	exclusive	ignores	the	
visceral	level	experiences	of	those	who	interact	with	Nature	on	a	different	plane	to	many	others	
living	in	the	West	(that	is,	amongst	environmental	activists).		
	
Ways	of	knowing		
Discussion	 of	 epistemology	 or	ways	 of	 knowing	 needs	 to	 take	 into	 account	 different	ways	 of	
knowing.	For	example,	this	can	include	the	‘rational’	(that	is,	science,	logic	and	factual	knowledge)	
and	the	‘affective’	(that	is,	emotions,	the	irrational	and	self‐denial).	It	can	include	knowledge	‘of’	
and	knowledge	‘about’.	For	the	most	part,	this	section	considers	a	particular	type	of	knowledge	
that	 is	often	 ignored	 in	many	accounts	of	environmental	harm:	namely,	 elder	knowledge.	But	
before	 doing	 so,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 consider	 other	 forms	 of	 contested	 knowledge	 relevant	 to	
understandings	and	perceptions	of	the	environment.		
	
Eco‐global	criminology	focuses	not	only	on	humans	as	environmental	victims	but	the	nonhuman	
as	well	(White	2011,	2013b).	This	refers	to	natural	objects	such	as	rivers,	mountains	and	oceans,	
as	well	as	flora	(plant	life)	and	fauna	(animal	life).	Consideration	of	the	nonhuman	environmental	
object	 incorporates	 discussion	 of	 individual	 landscape	 features	 and	 specific	 living	 entities,	
through	 to	 particular	 eco‐systems.	 Any	 particular	 ecosystem	 is	 made	 up	 of	 both	 abiotic	
components	 (air,	 water,	 soil,	 atoms	 and	 molecules)	 and	 biotic	 components	 (plants,	 animals,	
bacteria	 and	 fungi).	 The	 place	 of	 nonhuman	 environmental	 victims	 is	 increasingly	 important	
within	green	criminology	more	generally	and	within	the	emerging	area	of	jurisprudence	broadly	
referred	 to	 as	 Earth	 Law	 or	 Wild	 Law	 (Cullinan	 2003).	 In	 each	 instance	 the	 concern	 is	 to	
emphasise	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 and	 to	 establish	 new	 recognitions	 of	 and	
protections	for	the	nonhuman	in	law	and	legal	proceedings.		
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There	are	two	relevant	issues	worth	considering	here.	The	first	involves	asking	who	can	or	should	
speak	 for	and	on	behalf	of	whom.	Relevant	questions	 include	 ‘whose	voices’	 are	or	should	be	
heard	in	forums	such	as	courts;	how	this	ought	or	might	occur;	and,	specifically,	how	and	to	whom	
does	 non‐human	 nature	 communicate	 its	 needs.	 These	 are	 partly	 matters	 of	 standing	 and	
representation.	 But	 they	 are	 also	 about	 ‘speaking	 on	 behalf’.	 If	 the	 nonhuman	 is	 to	 be	
acknowledged	in	law	as	a	‘victim’,	then	the	nonhuman	must	be	able	to	convey,	in	some	way,	the	
nature	of	their	victimisation.	In	other	words,	the	non‐human	victim	needs	a	human	translator	to	
speak	on	their	behalf	about	the	nature	and	consequences	of	the	harms	suffered	(Stone	1972).	In	
practice,	this	means	advocates	must	give	voice	to	the	concerns	of	those	such	as	trees,	soil,	bees,	
orchids,	rivers	and	lakes	who	cannot	articulate	what	is	happening	to	them.	Increasingly,	including	
within	 environmental	 courts,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 there	 is	much	 to	 learn	 by	 bringing	 the	
nonhuman	into	the	dialogue	about	ecological	health	and	wellbeing	that	affects	all	(Besthorn	2004,	
2012;	Preston	2011;	Schlosberg	2007).	
	
But	whose	voice	‘on	behalf’	should	count?	By	way	of	illustration	as	to	the	difficulties	in	trying	to	
answer	this,	 it	can	be	noted	that	a	 ‘river’	may	be	defined	in	spiritual	and	cultural	terms	by	an	
Indigenous	 community;	 be	 viewed	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	water	 flow	 according	 to	 the	 narrow	
Eurocentric	conceptions	common	in	Australian	courts;	be	seen	as	being	constituted	by	its	channel	
banks	 and	 channel	 bed	 according	 to	 the	 science	 of	 geomorphology;	 and	be	 conceptualised	 as	
inclusive	of	riparian	zones,	which	relate	to	the	observed	influence	of	the	river	on	the	biota	within	
and	adjacent	to	the	river,	from	an	ecological	perspective	(see	Davies	et	al.	2011;	Morris	and	Ruru	
2010;	Taylor	and	Stokes	2005).	There	are	debates	over	who	should	speak	morally	for	Nature,	and	
debates	over	who	should	speak	authoritatively	about	Nature.		
	
In	practice,	an	extensive	range	of	expertise	and	technologies	 is	drawn	upon	by	bodies	such	as	
courts	in	assessing	environmental	harm.	The	kinds	of	experts	present	at	hearings,	for	example,	
include,	 among	 others,	 terrestrial	 ecologists,	 biologists,	 experts	 in	 aerial	 photography,	
environmental	 scientists,	 fauna	 ecologists,	 agricultural	 consultants,	 natural	 history	 and	
environmental	 consultants,	 veterinarians,	 ornithologists,	 wetland	 ecologists,	 frog	 biologists,	
plant	 ecologists,	 plant	 ecology	 and	 restoration	 experts,	 and	 arborists.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	many	
different	methods	and	techniques	are	utilised	in	pursuit	of	knowledge	about	environmental	harm,	
including	 site	 visits;	 photographs;	 taking	 of	 investigative	 samples	 by	 compliance	 officers;	
measuring	the	trunks	of	trees;	and	aerial	photographs	and	satellite	images.	Specific	expertise	is	
required	in	regards	to	different	kinds	of	environmental	harms	(for	example,	pollution,	clearfelling	
of	 trees,	 wildlife	 trafficking),	 and	 this	 is	 complicated	 by	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 thresholds	 and	
baselines,	identification	of	species,	and	degrees	of	vulnerability.		
	
Issues	of	epistemology	do	not	only	arise	 in	regard	to	disputes	over	who	should	or	should	not	
speak,	and	in	what	capacity,	in	regards	to	matters	of	environmental	harm.	The	vital	importance	
of	listening	and	learning	from	many	different	sources	is	highlighted	as	well	when	considering	the	
contributions	of	‘elder	knowledge’.	This	refers	to	the	stories	told	by	older	members	of	community,	
the	content	of	which	can	be	highly	revealing	of	what	once	was,	and	what	could	be	again.	Consider,	
for	example,	the	significance	of	elder	knowledge	in	relation	to	understanding	and	responding	to	
concerns	 about	 intergenerational	 equity.	 In	 gauging	 the	 state	 of	 the	 environment	 a	 range	 of	
scientific	studies	may	be	drawn	upon.	So,	too,	might	stories	from	the	elderly	(Suzuki	2010:	63).	
	
A	 documentary	 on	 fishing,	 Empty	Oceans,	 Empty	Nets,	 shown	 on	 PBS	 in	 2002,	
featured	an	interview	with	a	young	skipper	on	a	swordfish	boat	from	Boston	who	
stated	 that	 there	 are	 still	 plenty	 of	 swordfish.	 Based	 in	 Boston,	 she	 travels	 to	
Newfoundland,	where	she	reported	hearing	that	a	200‐pound	swordfish	had	been	
caught.	‘There	are	still	big	ones’,	she	said.	The	film	then	cut	to	an	interview	with	a	
grizzled	fisherman	who	must	have	been	in	his	eighties.	He	recounted	that	he	used	
to	fish	just	5	or	6	miles	out	of	Boston	and	would	throw	back	anything	under	200	
pounds!	Two	fishers	with	radically	different	baselines.	To	the	young	skipper,	a	trip	
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all	the	way	to	Newfoundland	was	standard	procedure,	while	a	200‐pounder	was	a	
big	fish.	(In	fact,	the	average	size	of	swordfish	before	1963	was	266	pounds;	it	had	
fallen	to	133	pounds	in	1973,	and	to	90	pounds	in	1996).		
	
Substantial	changes	have	occurred	across	a	range	of	environmental	 indices.	Many	of	these	are	
and	have	been	measured	using	scientific	methodologies.	However,	as	this	story	indicates,	a	jolt	of	
elder	knowledge	may	also	usefully	put	things	into	broad	perspective	as	well	as	have	considerable	
emotional	impact.	
	
Elder	knowledge	is	also	used	to	marshal	challenges	to	‘official’	knowledge.	In	Hobart,	Tasmania,	
for	 example,	 an	 elderly	woman	 named	 Poppy	 Lopatniuk	 began	 to	 agitate	 around	 toxic	 dump	
issues	when	she	noticed	that	people	in	her	street,	and	her	household,	were	falling	ill	at	seemingly	
disproportionate	rates	and	of	unusual	illnesses.	She	made	a	link	between	the	old	rubbish	tip	and	
the	health	of	 local	 residents.	However,	 those	 in	power	 felt	 that	 the	 ‘evidence’	did	not	 support	
Poppy’s	 claims	 and	 concerns.	 For	 example,	 the	 Cancer	 Register	 was	 used	 by	 the	 Health	
Department	to	dismiss	the	problem	(there	is	not	an	unusual	pattern	of	cancer	types	and	rates	
over	 the	 locality	as	 a	whole)	 rather	 than	 to	 suggest	 the	need	 for	more	precise	analysis	of	 the	
clustering	of	local	cancers	and	other	ills	(Poppy	found	in	excess	of	40	cancer	diagnoses	mostly	in	
the	two	small	streets	on	either	side	of	the	landfill	area).	Official	examination	of	the	issues	was	
oriented	toward	general	conclusions	that	legitimised	inertia	on	the	issues.	But	Poppy	‘knew’	that	
something	was	wrong.	This	was	embedded	in	her	actual	life	experiences,	her	relationships	with	
real	live,	flesh	and	blood	family	members	and	neighbours,	and	her	time	spent	living	in	the	area.	
In	2012,	Poppy	published	her	story	in	a	book	titled	Tomorrow’s	Children.	She	was	85	at	the	time.	
The	 key	message	 of	 Poppy’s	 book	 is	 that	 we	 ignore	 our	 Elders	 and	 Elder	 Knowledge	 at	 our	
collective	peril.		
	
Ways	of	doing		
Methodology	refers	to	ways	of	doing	things.	One	of	the	foundations	of	eco‐global	criminology	is	
the	necessity	 to	 engage	with	others	 in	 the	process	of	doing.	That	 is,	eco‐global	criminology	 is	
ultimately	a	social	exercise	(involving	not	only	people	but	also	eco‐systems,	plants	and	animals).	
This	 necessarily	 means	 that	 such	 research	 embodies	 certain	 ethical	 decisions	 and	
responsibilities,	and	a	need	to	respect	what	it	is	we	are	doing	and	with	whom	we	are	doing	it.	For	
example,	how	is	it	possible	to	be	sensitive	to	situation	and	context	if	you	are	not	actually	talking	
and	 engaging	 with	 local	 people?	 The	 notion	 of	 outsider/insider	 is	 a	 real	 and	 meaningful	
distinction	 that	 is	 forged	 in	 the	 crucible	of	 local	 experiences,	 longstanding	 cultural	 traditions,	
relationship	to	imperial	power,	and	positioning	in	the	wider	global	political	economy.	Bridging	
the	 gap	 requires	 dialogue	 (not	 monologue),	 listening	 (not	 lecturing)	 and	 give‐and‐take	
interchange	(not	just	giving,	or	just	taking)	(White	2009:	236).		
	
In	terms	of	potential	sources	of	knowledge,	it	may	well	be	that	it	is	local	residents,	local	workers	
and	laypeople	generally	who	are	more	conscious	of	environmental	risk	than	the	scientist	or	the	
politician.	 Some	 indication	of	 this	 is	provided	 in	a	study	of	 interaction	between	scientists	and	
English	sheep	farmers	in	the	wake	of	the	1986	Chernobyl	nuclear	accident	in	the	Ukraine	(Wynne	
1998).	 The	 study	 highlighted	 the	 accurate,	 detailed	 and	 contextual	 knowledge	 of	 the	 local	
farmers,	 even	 though	 the	 scientists	 considered	 this	 layperson	 knowledge	 to	 be	 lacking	 in	
precision.	Those	who	are	closer	to	the	‘coal	face’	and	who	have	lived	and	worked	in	the	same	area	
for	years	are	frequently	those	who	notice	the	small	changes	that	are	the	harbingers	of	things	to	
come.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 social	 networking	 can	 be	 brought	 into	 positive	 and	 productive	
surveillance	of	endangered	flora	and	fauna,	with	community	members	providing	instant	alerts	
when	 criminal	 violations	 are	 occurring.	 Citizen	 scientists	 can	 also	 be	 recruited	 to	 undertake	
testing	of	water	and	waste	at	factory	outlets	and	tip	sites.	Computer	assisted	mapping	can	help	to	
track	the	movement	of	animals,	plants,	toxic	materials	and	other	substances	around	the	world.	
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Yet	this	occurs	in	social	and	political	contexts	that	can	be	extremely	dangerous	for	activists	and	
researchers	alike	(Clark	2009;	Global	Witness	2014).		
	
Informed	expertise	is	built	upon	processes	that	expand	the	horizons	of	knowledge	and	that,	as	
part	of	this,	incorporate	the	insights	of	people	from	many	different	backgrounds.	This	requires	
openness	 to	 the	 interplay	 between	 class,	 race,	 ethnicity,	 gender	 and	 other	 social	 variables	 in	
differentially	positioning	people	(individually	and	collectively)	in	regards	to	social	location	and	
situated	knowledge.	It	also	demands	adoption	of	multiple	methods	of	study	and	a	wide	variety	of	
ways	in	which	to	engage	in	dialogic	social	relationships	(see,	for	example,	Banerjee	and	Bell	2007;	
Dodson,	Piatelli	and	Schmalzbauer	2007).	It	is	important,	as	well,	to	not	‘read	off’	the	knowledge	
that	people	have	of	the	world	simply	by	assuming	that	certain	ways	of	‘doing’	lead	to	particular	
knowledge	outcomes.	For	example,	Indigenous	people	do	not	‘think	the	same	way’	just	because	
they	 are	 Indigenous	 and/or	 just	 because	 they	 may	 have	 a	 connection	 to	 ‘country’.	 This	 is	
illustrated	in	the	political	divisions	within	Indigenous	(and	non‐Indigenous)	communities	when	
it	comes	to	debates	over	economic	development	versus	environmental	protection.		
	
There	are	also	other	social	and	cultural	considerations	that	impact	upon	the	doing	of	knowledge	
production.	For	example,	in	undertaking	research	in	Fiji	and	Tonga	on	how	communities	respond	
to	natural	disasters	such	as	cyclones,	Johnson	(2015)	lived	and	worked	in	the	small	communities	
on	remote	islands.	During	one	trip	she	brought	her	two	young	children	with	her	as	well	as	her	
partner.	Her	status	as	‘mother’	and	‘parent’	opened	up	interesting	opportunities	to	talk	with	local	
women	 about	 all	 manner	 of	 issues.	 Simultaneously,	 her	 presence	 as	 a	 ‘white’	 ‘Australian’	
‘researcher’	also	granted	her	certain	status	with	the	male	leaders	of	the	community.	In	essence,	
she	lived	a	series	of	contingent	and	contextualised	identities	(Johnston	2015).	She	was	‘woman’,	
‘mother’,	 ‘researcher’	 and	 ‘outsider’	 depending	 upon	 circumstance	 and	 with	 whom	 she	 was	
interacting.	Perceptions	of	her	shifted	according	to	situational	factors	but,	in	each	instance,	she	
had	to	be	conscious	of	her	own	responsibilities	and	accountabilities,	depending	upon	the	nature	
of	the	exchange.	Both	identity	and	knowledge	exchange	was	a	continuous	process	of	negotiation	
and	dialogue.		
	
Ways	 of	 doing	 also	 extends	 to	 matters	 of	 scientific	 standards	 and	 social	 difference,	 the	
generalisability	 of	 certain	 types	 of	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 (for	 example,	 Indigenous	
connections	 to	 ‘country’),	 and	 assessment	 of	 the	 judgements	 made	 by	 holders	 of	 traditional	
knowledge	 (such	 as	 farmers,	 fishers	 and	 loggers).	 In	 regards	 to	 these,	 there	 are	 the	
methodological	 problems	 associated	 with	 partial	 knowledge	 (that	 is,	 knowledge	 that	 is	
incomplete	since	it	is	limited	to	only	one	kind	of	domain	expertise,	such	as	soil	testing,	rather	than	
drawing	 upon	 different	 sources	 of	 data	 such	 as	 patient	 records);	 skewed	 knowledge	 (that	 is,	
knowledge	that	is	in	some	way	biased	even	if	accurate	within	its	own	terms	of	reference,	such	as	
sampling	 techniques	 that	 include	water	 testing	at	 the	optimum	non‐toxic	outflow	 time	rather	
than	random	testing	throughout	a	day	or	specified	time	period);	and	distorted	knowledge	(that	
is,	knowledge	that	is	more	akin	to	propaganda,	being	ideologically	based,	as	in	ad	hominem	or	
personal	attacks	against	 specific	protagonists	 rather	 than	addressing	 the	underlying	 issues	as	
such)	(White	and	Heckenberg	2014:	249).		
	
As	an	illustration	of	the	fluidity	of	knowledge	and	knowledge	production,	the	potential	risks	and	
special	 vulnerabilities	 of	 children	 to	 environmental	 harms	 can	 be	 examined.	 Children	 are	
especially	vulnerable	compared	to	adults,	for	example.	It	has	been	observed	that:	
	
While	acknowledging	that	childhoods	around	the	world	are	very	different	and	that	
children	 do	 not	 comprise	 a	 self‐evidently	 unitary	 group	 (any	 more	 than	 do	
‘women’	 or	 ‘people	 of	 colour’),	 we	 can	 still	 see	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 special	
characteristics	of	children’s	biology	and	development	represent	a	foundation	for	
regarding	children	as	a	special	category	of	environmental	victims.	(Stephens	1996:	
75)		
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They	also	confront	bigger	risks:	‘Special	attention	should	be	devoted	to	children	because	they	are	
generally	more	 vulnerable	 than	 adults	 to	 environmental	 hazards.	 They	 breathe	more	 air	 and	
consume	more	food	and	water	relative	to	their	size	than	adults,	their	bodies	are	still	developing	
and	they	have	little	control	over	their	environment’.	The	message	is	that	children	are	not	‘little	
adults’	 and	 are	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 environmental	 hazards,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 ‘Recent	
estimates	suggest	that	almost	90%	of	the	global	burden	of	disease	from	climate	change	is	borne	
by	children’	(World	Health	Organisation	2009:	12).	
	
Children	also	face	differential	risks.	For	instance,	in	the	use	of	pesticides	to	prevent	the	spread	of	
disease	borne	by	mosquitoes,	there	are	‘hidden’	costs	that	may	not	be	factored	in.	For	instance,	
children	 and	 those	 with	 chemical	 sensitivities	 will	 suffer	 disproportionately	 if	 chemicals	 are	
sprayed,	since	they	are	more	vulnerable	than	others	to	ill	effects	arising	from	the	treatment.	In	
such	circumstances,	the	crucial	questions	are	not	only	‘how	many	will	be	harmed’	but	also	‘who	
will	 be	harmed’?	 (Scott	 2005:	56).	 To	 appreciate	 this,	we	need	 to	 be	 conscious	of	 differences	
within	affected	populations.	The	risk	assessment	process	by	which	 ‘safe	 levels’	of	exposure	 to	
chemicals	and	other	pollutants	are	assessed	is	highly	problematic,	and	incorporates	a	range	of	
ideological	and	moral	assumptions.	As	Field	(1998:	90)	comments,	 ‘The	use	of	 the	apparently	
reasonable	 scientific	 concept	 of	 average	 risk,	 for	 example,	 means	 that	 data	 from	 the	 most	
sensitive	individuals,	such	as	children,	will	not	be	the	basis	for	regulation,	but	rather	data	from	
the	 “statistically	 average”	 person’.	 Thus,	 science	 provides	 grounds	 upon	which	 we	may	 base	
judgements	but	these	grounds	are	not	necessarily	neutral	in	terms	of	social	impact.	
	
Ways	of	valuing		
The	term	axiology	describes	a	concern	with	the	normative:	that	is,	with	ways	of	valuing.	Here	a	
crucial	concern	of	eco‐global	criminology	is	appreciation	of	the	‘value’	of	the	nonhuman	as	well	
as	the	human.	In	other	words,	the	essence	of	the	eco‐global	criminology	project	is	the	fight	for	
social	and	ecological	justice.	At	the	heart	of	investigations	into	transnational	environmental	harm	
is	the	question	of	whose	knowledge	of	‘wrong’	is	right?	In	other	words,	whose	voices	are	going	to	
be	heard	and	which	kinds	of	evidence	are	to	be	given	credibility?	It	is	rare	that	evidence	of	harm	
is	uncontested	and	that	proof	of	environmental	harm	is	simply	a	matter	of	‘let	the	facts	decide’	
(White	2008).	There	are	several	different	types	of	knowledge	including	scientific,	common‐sense,	
experiential	and	technical.	As	this	article	has	also	indicated,	there	are	many	different	sources	of	
knowledge	 in	 addition	 to	 scientific	 disciplines,	 including	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 layperson;	 the	
knowledge	of	workers	such	as	farmers,	fishers,	and	loggers;	the	knowledge	of	Indigenous	peoples	
in	diverse	settings;	and	the	knowledge	of	technicians	who	use	particular	instruments	to	measure	
and	appraise	aspects	of	the	world	around	them.		
	
Yet	whose	knowledge	counts	–	as	colonial	history	attests,	contemporary	 forms	of	exploitation	
reinforce,	and	the	challenge	posed	by	elder	viewpoints	and	children’s	vulnerabilities	confirm	–	is	
subject	 to	 contestation.	 These	 observations	 are	 especially	 pertinent	 when	 considering	 the	
knowledge	produced,	held	and	transmitted	by	traditional	land	users	and	Indigenous	communities	
in	relation	to	their	particular	environments	(Robyn	2002).	These	same	voices	and	perspectives	
are	also	those	most	likely	to	be	subjugated	and	marginalised	in	the	face	of	transnational	corporate	
quests	to	exploit	natural	resources	(Gedicks	2005).		
	
Biopiracy	provides	an	example	of	 this	as	 it	 is	 also	 linked	 to	 the	exploitation	of	 resources	and	
knowledge.	It	can	be	understood	in	relation	to	‘traditional	knowledge	of	the	uses	of	plants’	(TKUP)	
and	 the	 usurpation	 of	 ownership	 and	 control	 over	 plants	 using	 Western	 legal	 and	 political	
institutional	mechanisms	(such	as	patents)	and	forums	(free‐trade	agreements).	As	explained	by	
Mgbeoji	(2006),	corporate	interests	have	used	two	methods	to	take	what	they	want:	institutional	
and	 juridical	 mechanisms	 (such	 as	 patents);	 and	 gendered	 and	 racist	 constructions	 of	 non‐
Western	 contributions	 to	 plant	 development	 and	 use	 (such	 as	 ‘traditional’	 methods	 versus	
‘scientific’).	
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Most	 important,	 the	 legal	 and	 policy	 factors	 that	 facilitate	 the	 appropriation	 of	
indigenous	peoples	knowledge	operate	within	a	cultural	context	that	subtly	but	
persistently	 denigrates	 the	 intellectual	 worth	 of	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	
peoples,	 especially	 local	women	 farmers.	 Cultural	 biases	 in	 the	 construction	 of	
knowledge	 provide	 the	 epistemological	 framework	 within	 which	 plant	 genetic	
resources	developed	by	indigenous	peoples	are	continually	construed	as	‘free‐for‐
all’	commodities	–	commodities	that	are	just	waiting	to	be	appropriated	by	those	
with	the	cunning	and	resources	to	do	so.	(Mgbeoji	2006:	6)	
	
Thus	the	exploitation	of	traditional	knowledge	and	people’s	resources	is	accomplished	through	
entirely	‘legal’	means.		
	
By	contrast	 are	approaches	 that	 recognise	and	cherish	 the	environmental	 value	of	 traditional	
knowledge.	 This	 includes,	 for	 example,	 forest‐related	 knowledge	 associated	with	 the	 use	 and	
management	of	 forest	species,	and	the	broader	understanding	and	management	of	 forest	eco‐
systems.	In	essence,	traditional	users	have	over	many	years	developed	their	own	technological	
understanding	of	their	environment,	and	this	is	exhibited	by	those	who	live	and	work	intimately	
with	and	on	the	land	(and	rivers,	lakes	and	oceans).	Examples	of	such	knowledge	include	use	of	
herbal	medicines,	nutraceutical	products,	food	and	beverage.	For	many,	the	forest	exists	as	a	site	
of	not	only	wood	products	(for	cooking,	 for	 furniture,	 for	musical	 instruments)	but	non‐wood	
products	 such	 as	 medicines,	 foods,	 spices,	 fodder	 for	 animals	 and	 for	 a	 multitude	 of	 other	
purposes	 including	 aesthetic	 and	 spiritual	 (Food	 and	 Agriculture	 Organization	 of	 the	 United	
Nations	2011).	 Conservation	measures	 that	 do	not	 acknowledge	 traditional	 human	users	 and	
their	 systemic	 contribution	 to	 biological	 diversity	 and	 ecological	 wellbeing	 may	 well	 be	
oppressive	 and	 counter‐productive	 (Brisman,	 South	 and	 White	 2015).	 This,	 too,	 is	 of	 major	
concern	to	eco‐global	criminology.		
	
There	are	other	issues	worthy	of	attention	as	well.	The	eco‐global	criminology	interest	in	eco‐
justice	finds	expression	in	the	notion	that	all	things	have	the	right	to	‘be’	and	to	‘do’	in	ways	that	
reflect	their	core	or	defining	trait	or	characteristic,	including	abiotic	or	non‐living	entities	such	as	
rivers.	For	instance,	Earth	Law	as	applied	to	a	river	would	incorporate	the	following	conception	
of	rights:		
	
A	fundamental	river	right	(that	is,	the	riverine	equivalent	of	a	human	right)	would	
be	the	right	to	flow.	If	a	water	body	couldn’t	flow	it	wouldn’t	be	a	river,	and	so	the	
capacity	 to	 flow	 (given	 sufficient	water)	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 river.	
Therefore,	from	the	perspective	of	the	river,	building	so	many	damns	across	it	and	
extracting	so	much	water	from	it	that	it	ceased	to	flow	into	the	sea,	would	be	an	
abuse	of	its	Earth	rights.	(Cullinan	2003:	118)	
	
Similar	interests	are	apparent	in	the	area	of	animal	law,	in	which	concern	has	tended	to	revolve	
around	interlinked	issues	pertaining	to	animal	welfare	and	animal	rights,	as	well	as	duty	of	care	
on	 the	part	of	humans	 toward	nonhuman	animals	(see,	 for	example,	Ascione	2010;	Francione	
2008;	Singer	1975).	Others	have	argued	that	plants,	too,	should	be	included	within	the	realm	of	
human	moral	consideration,	and	that	some	Indigenous	cultures	recognise	plants	as	persons	and	
thus	as	appropriate	recipients	of	respect	and	care	(Hall	2011).		
	
Surrogate	victims	(namely,	humans)	have	in	some	instances	been	accepted	by	particular	courts	
as	 representing	 a	 nonhuman	 entity	 that	 has	 been	 harmed.	 For	 example,	 the	 ‘environment’	 is	
considered	a	 ‘victim’	in	New	Zealand	law	and	environmental	court	judicial	practice	and	in	one	
instance	a	 river	was	represented	at	a	 restorative	 justice	conference	by	 the	chairperson	of	 the	
Waikato	River	Enhancement	Society	(Hamilton	2008).	Public	 interest	environmental	 litigation	
has	also	been	used	to	establish	future	generations	as	victims	of	environmental	crime,	with	the	
victims	 also	 including	 the	 environment	 and	 non‐human	 biota,	 although	 the	 success	 of	 such	
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litigation	is	contingent	upon	where	cases	are	tried	and	under	what	circumstances	(contrast	Mehta	
2009,	 for	 example,	 with	 McGrath	 2008).	 A	 recent	 decision	 by	 India’s	 Minister	 of	 the	
Environmental	and	Forests	to	ban	dolphin	shows	is	significant	as	well,	with	the	Central	Animal	
Authority	issuing	the	statement	that	‘Cetaceans	…	should	be	seen	as	“non‐human	persons”	and	as	
such	should	have	their	own	specific	rights’	(Bancroft‐Hinchey	2013).	The	enhancement	of	animal	
welfare	laws,	plus	legal	reform	and	court	decisions	in	some	jurisdictions	that	lean	toward	formal	
recognition	of	particular	species	as	rights‐holders	(for	example,	dolphins,	whales	and	apes),	 is	
indicative	 of	 broad	 trends	 toward	 both	 legal	 standing	 and	 appreciation	 of	 the	 victimisation	
experienced	by	nonhuman	entities	(Mumto	2014).		
	
For	present	purposes,	recent	developments	are	of	particular	interest	in	that	they	raise	interesting	
philosophical	and	practical	issues.	For	example,	in	New	Zealand	the	Whanganui	River	became	a	
legal	entity	 in	2012,	with	a	 legal	voice	 that	 involves	 local	Maori	people	speaking	on	 its	behalf	
(Shuttleworth	2012).	The	importance	of	this	is	that	it	formally	acknowledges	‘agency’	on	the	part	
of	 the	 river	 in	 and	 during	 legal	 proceedings.	 The	 Maori	 relationship	 with	 Nature	 has	 been	
expressed	as	follows:	
	
Indigenous	peoples	throughout	the	world	have	strong	connections	to	the	flowing	
freshwater	of	rivers.	For	instance,	Maori	–	the	Indigenous	peoples	of	Aotearoa	New	
Zealand	–	view	many	rivers	as	tupuna	(ancestors)	and	invoke	the	name	of	a	river	
to	 assert	 their	 identity.	 There	 is	 a	 deep	 belief	 that	 humans	 and	 water	 are	
intertwined	as	is	encapsulated	in	common	tribal	sayings	such	as	‘I	am	the	river	and	
the	river	is	me’	and	‘the	river	belongs	to	us	just	as	we	belong	to	the	river’.	(Morris	
and	Ruru	2010:	49)		
	
Yet,	 the	 notion	 of	 specific	 rights	 also	 opens	 the	 door	 to	 contestation	 over	 these	 rights.	 For	
example,	rivers	are	now	being	conceptualised	as	possessing	rights	in	at	least	two	different	ways:	
firstly,	as	above,	in	relation	to	stewardship	populations,	such	as	Indigenous	people,	in	which	there	
is	a	presumed	unity	of	the	river	with	the	Indigenous	population.	The	people	and	the	river	speak	
as	one.		
	
Secondly,	 however,	 rivers	 may	 have	 rights	 conferred	 upon	 them	 via	 specific	 and	 targeted	
legislation	 that	 states	 that	 this	 river	 has	 protected	 status	 and	 certain	 rights	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	
legislation,	and	that	its	interests	are	autonomous	from	Indigenous	claims	and	stewardship.	For	
example,	in	Queensland,	the	purpose	of	the	Wild	Rivers	Act	2005	(Qld)	was	to	(a)	preserve	the	
natural	values	of	rivers	that	have	all,	or	almost	all,	of	their	natural	values	intact;	and	(b)	provide	
for	 the	preservation	of	 the	natural	values	of	 rivers	 in	 the	Lake	Eyre	Basin.	 It	was	 repealed	 in	
November	2014.	Wild	Rivers	was	supported	by	the	Labor	Party,	scientists	and	environmentalist	
groups	such	as	the	Wilderness	Society	but	heavily	contested	by	some	local	Indigenous	leaders	
and	communities	who	argued	that	it	deprived	Indigenous	people	of	economic	opportunities.	As	
prominent	Indigenous	leader	Noel	Pearson	stated:	 ‘Traditional	owners	should	decide	whether	
they	want	conservation	or	a	mixture	of	both.	We	don’t	want	this	unilaterally	imposed	on	them	by	
political	deals	 in	Brisbane’	(see	Fraser	2014;	Rebgetz,	Arthur	and	Agius	2014).	The	legislation	
was	intended	to	give	these	rivers	particular	rights	(for	example,	analogous	to	the	Earth	right	to	
‘be’).	However,	 these	were	constructed	 in	a	way	 that	both	separated	 the	rivers	 from	the	 local	
Indigenous	people	(contrary	to	conceptualisation	of	the	People/Nature	unity)	and	superseded	
Indigenous	rights	to	the	rivers.	So	whose	rights	should	be	privileged	in	this	kind	of	situation,	and	
why?		
	
For	eco‐justice	criminology,	responding	to	these	issues	demands	some	type	of	criteria	in	weighing	
up	 the	 interests,	 options	 and	 consequences	 of	 particular	 courses	 of	 action.	 At	 a	 minimum	 it	
requires	attention	being	given	to	the	specific	 interests,	harms	and	rights	 involved.	Put	simply,	
there	is	a	need	to	provide	the	basis	upon	which	to	privilege	some	interests	over	others,	in	given	
circumstances	and	situations	(for	example,	rather	than	all	species	being	treated	the	same	or	as	
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having	in	essence	the	same	rights	or	worth).	It	may	well	be	that	there	is	no	general,	fixed	criterion	
or	method	for	ascertaining	moral	priority.	But	the	necessity	for	judgement	means	that	decision‐
making	 is	 best	 served	 by	 an	 awareness	 of	 why	 certain	 rights	 are	 contested,	 the	 competing	
interests	that	underpin	such	processes,	and	the	paradoxes	and	unintended	consequences	of	any	
choices	that	are	made.	A	metaphorical	balancing	up	of	moral	weight	is	always	going	to	be	complex	
and	far	reaching	(White	2013b).		
	
Conclusion	
At	one	 level,	 the	response	 to	 the	 issues,	problems,	 limitations	and	dilemmas	presented	 in	this	
article	 are	 quite	 simple:	 we	 need	 more	 dialogue,	 more	 sharing	 of	 ideas,	 more	 collaborative	
research	and	more	careful	listening,	and	this	has	to	happen	across	many	different	knowledge	and	
skill	domains.	Eco‐global	criminology	in	fact	has	a	mandate	to	foster	global	cooperation	insofar	
as	 the	driving	concern	 is	achieving	eco‐justice	 in	ways	 that	 involve	addressing	both	 legal	and	
illegal	acts	and	omissions	that	do	environmental	harm,	wherever	these	may	occur.		
	
Yet,	there	is	still	one	final	conundrum	that	requires	further	consideration.	This	is	the	conundrum	
posed	 by	 ‘commonsense’	 thinking.	 For	 the	 commonsense	 has	 the	 uncanny	 ability	 to	 bring	
together	a	wide	range	of	fragmented,	paradoxical	and	outright	contradictory	ideas	into	the	one	
unified	but	messy	framework.	To	some	extent,	the	commonsense	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	
non‐thinking	 ‘obviousness’	 of	 habitus:	 that	 is,	 entrenched	ways	 of	 being,	 thinking,	 doing	 and	
valuing	that	broach	little	critique	or	second	thought.	But	the	‘commonsense’	is	also	fostered	by	
hegemonic	ideological	processes	that	both	allow	and	deny	the	existence	of	phenomena	such	as	
global	warming	and	climate	change.	What	is	 ‘good’,	 ‘fair’	and	‘just’	is	thus	liable	to	mean	many	
things	simultaneously.		
	
One	aim	of	eco‐global	criminology	is	to	try	to	bring	some	sensibility	to	this	clutter;	to	provide	a	
coherent,	critical	narrative	to	the	commonsense	embedded	in	those	concrete	practices	that	are	
rapidly	destroying	the	very	basis	of	life	as	we	know	it.	
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